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THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ON A STOCHASTIC FISHERY MODEL
Survival rates and carrying capacities in a fishery may be strongly affected by 
variations in climatic factors. When the stock is under control of a single manager, 
information about the stochastic growth parameters leads to improved economic re­
turn. However, when the stock is transboundary, additional information concerning 
the stochastic parameters can lead to overharvesting and in turn to lower economic 
returns.
To show this, we formulate the model as an optimal control problem in a game 
theoretic setting. We find the optimal harvest proportions using dynamic program­
ming, maximizing the utility at each stage of the game. We then simulate the model 
using the derived harvest proportions. The generated data is analyzed to determine 
the effect information has on the utility function.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years there has been increasing recognition of the impact of environmental 
stochasticity on major marine fisheries worldwide. The management of a fish stock is 
complicated by the resulting uncertainties. The goal of this paper is to provide a bet­
ter understanding of the impact of knowledge on these stochastic fisheries. The intent 
is to ascertain whether earlier and more accurate information regarding the stochastic 
environmental conditions might allow for better management of the resource. This is 
indeed the case when a single manager controls the resource, however we will show 
this is not necessarily the case when the stock is transboundary.
We examine a model with classical assumptions. In [3] Clark studied a discrete 
time bioeconomic model for the harvesting of a renewable animal resource. The con­
trol theory problem was solved using dynamic programming under simple assumptions 
concerning growth and utilization of the stock. Later in [6 ], Levhari and Mirman in-
1
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corporated the above assumptions into a game-theoretic setting. Beverton and Holt 
[2 ] previously had noted the difficulties in using purely deterministic models. In the 
papers of Mann [7] , Jacquette [5] and Reed [11] , the growth parameters are con­
sidered as random variables. In some cases the time sequence of parameters were 
considered to be Markov chains while in other cases the parameters were taken to be 
independt and identically distributed (i.i.d).
There has been considerable progress in non-cooperative game theory since the 
above papers were written. Fudenberg and Tirole [4] state we now have a deeper 
understanding of the role of information and how it impacts the outcomes of games. 
One would expect that these developments would have been applied to fishery models. 
However, McKelvey in [8] states: ‘It seems the full potential of the approach has yet 
to be achieved. In particular, the negative implications of uncertain and asymmetric 
information has not really been explored in harvesting models. ’
In this paper we propose a study of the effects of uncertainty in a stochastic model. 
We focus on the role of incomplete information and on a comparison of outcomes 
in game versions that incorporate alternative information structures. We start by 
considering the following model. Two independently operated fleets competitively 
harvest a fish stock. The harvesting occurs annually. Each fleet selectively chooses 
a harvesting policy in order to maximize their discounted long term returns. The 
choice is made in response to the expected competitors harvest policy. In the classical 
version of the game, the two fleets harvest simultaneously from a common stock. In
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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our version, the fish stock migrates from one countries fishing grounds to another 
countries fishing grounds. The fish are harvested sequentially as it travels from its 
aduit feeding grounds to its spawning grounds.
We will examine several cases of the basic model starting with a sole manager of 
the stock under deterministic growth conditions. We proceed to introduce stochas- 
ticity by allowing Markov stochasticity to occur in the stock-recruitment relation, 
loosely simulating the occurrence of El Nino marine climatic events. Later we al­
low multiple fleets an opportunity to harvest the stock sequentially under stochastic 
growth conditions. Here we allow the fleets to have ascertained different knowledge 
about the growth parameters. Specifically we consider three cases: a fleet will only 
know last years growth rate, this years growth rate or the fleet may know next years 
growth rate. We allow different fleets to have different knowledge in a single game.
We demonstrate that when a single manager is employed, an increase in knowledge 
leads to an increase in economic return. However, a wide variety of situations arise 
when the fishery is competitive. For example, an increase in knowledge by both 
players will increase the return for the first fleet while a decrease in return will be 
observed for the following fleet.
In the last chapter we consider the spatially separated model proposed by McK- 
elvey [9] and McKelvey and Cripe [10]. Here the stochasticity is of two kinds. The 
biological growth parameter is a Markovian random variable as in the previous chap­
ters. The second way in which stochasticity appears is through a splitting of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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stock, with a fraction, 9, available for fleet 1 and the fraction, 1 — 9. available for 
fleet 2. Here the harvesting takes place simultaneously, although in different ‘split 
streams.’ We assume theta to be i.i.d. The model formulation is based loosely on the 
Canadian-U.S. harvest competition over Canada’s Fraser river sockeye salmon stock. 
In that real-world fishery, the spawning run splits as it rounds Vancouver Island, with 
only a fraction of the fish being available for the U.S. to harvest.
This time, instead of only allowing past, previous or future knowledge concerning 
the stochastic parameters, we consider an imprecise measurement of the stochastic 
parameters. We assume a player knows the proportion of observations measured 
correctly. For example, if the measurement is correct with probability .5, the fleet 
has gained no additional knowledge, whereas if the player measures correctly with 
probability 1 , the fleet has full knowledge of the current condition.
We include below a list of notations used throughout the paper. A generic fleet is 
denoted by player u.
List of Notations
7  - discount factor 
R  - recruitment
R+- recruitment in the following year 
S  - escapement 
h - harvest proportion
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
h - maximum harvest proportion
— — 
h - calculated optimal harvest proportion in interior (0  <  h < h )
r  - number of years remaining before horizon
b - growth parameter
b+ - growth parameter in the following year 
Pnm - probability of state bn moving to state 6m 
v - generic fleet 
v - v's opponent 
F  =  A S b - growth function 
Y  =  hvR„ - yield
U =  * utility function
K R )  =  A (^ (« ) )
M (R )  = R -n (R )
KS) = &U{S)
A (5) =  S X
P  =  [Pnm]
B  - diagonal m atrix with entries &i, • - • 6n 
Q — B P
9 - fraction of fish in player at's stream
9U - fraction of recruitment R  in player v's stream
9V - measurement of 9 taken by player v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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bv - measurement of b taken by player u 
=  prob(b =  bj | bu =  bi) for player v 
x ui3 = prob(b =  bj | bu =  bi) for player u 
q\j =  prob(Q = 9j \9  =  #*) for player u 
Qij =  Pt*o6(0„ =  | 0  =  #i) for player u
a - total fraction of fish harvested in split stream game 
Pi =  prob(b — bi) 
pi = prob(b = bi) 
qi = prob(9 = 9i)
%  =  prob{9„ =  Qi)
( \pll p12
-Olp. p22
b =  average of the bi 
jnm  = prob(bn D bm) 
snm — prob(9n (~19m)
DPE - dynamic programming equation 
i.i.d- independent and identically distributed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 2
Sole M anagem ent
In this chapter we determine the optimal harvest when the stock is under the control 
of a single manager. We first examine, as a baseline case, a model with fixed growth 
parameters. Next, we will generalize the model to allow for cyclic patterns in the 
growth function. Finally we will introduce stochasticity into our model.
Deterministic Case
We start with the purely autonomous version of our deterministic model. A sole man­
ager controls the harvest of a single fish stock. The life-cycle of the fish is illustrated 
in the diagram below.
R  -> S  =  (1 -  h)R F t  =  F(S).
7
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The fleet has a certain amount of fish available for harvest, called the recruitment, 
R. At the appropriate time, the fleet takes a proportion, h, of the available stock for 
harvesting. We assume for social, economic or physical reasons, the proportion of 
available stock harvested is limited, and so
Q < h < h < l .
Associated with each harvesting season is a yield, Y  =  hR. After the fleet has 
harvested a proportion of the available stock, the escapement, 5  =  (1 — h)R, is some 
fraction of the initial recruitment R. The escapement then spawns, providing the 
subsequent season’s recruitment R*. We set R+=F(S),  where the growth function F  
is typically chosen to be monotone-increasing with a fixed, unique carrying capacity 
K such that F(K )  =  K .  In this paper we use the growth function chosen by Levhari 
and Mirman. Explicitly,
RT = F(S)  =  A Sb, 
with 1 >  .4 > 0 and 0 < 6 <  1 . This results in a carrying capacity of
K  = A & .
We choose to normalize the number of fish by using K  as the unit of measurement.
In our baseline autonomous case, .4 and b are taken to be constant over time.
The fleet chooses a certain risk averse utility function U l . We choose, as Levhari 
XA risk averse utility function /, is one where the expected utility of a fifty-fifty gamble between
two alternatives has a less desirable outcome than taking the utility of the average, /(a) +  f(b) <
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and Mirman did,
U{R) =  S ' / l n t m
t=0
where 7  is a constant discount factor, 0 < 7  <  1 and T  is the number of harvesting 
seasons considered.
We should note that usually economists wish to study profit and not utility. We 
have left out the cost of production and variable market prices from our model. This 
has been done to ensure the model is analytically tractable. In general, profit will 
not be directly related to utility. However if the number of fish being caught and sold 
does not vary much from season to season, the utility should be a resonable measure 
of profit.
The fleet then wishes to maximize its utility function by optimally choosing a 
harvest proportion for each year. Our goal is then to find, if it exists, an optimal 
harvest proportion for each year that the harvesting game is played. This can be 
done by choosing the harvest proportion hl for each t €  0 . . .  T. We then take the 
limit as T  -»• 00  to find a time-independent solution. When this happens we say 
the game has an infinite time-horizon. At each stage of a finite-horizon game let r  
represent the number of harvesting periods remaining prior to termination. As such 
the harvest policy is of the form
m u  -
At any time t, the fleet’s utility function satisfies the dynamic programming equation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(DPE)
U{R) = max {in(M2) +  7 ^ ( ^ +)}- (2.1)
0 <h<h
with a different haxvest proportion for each cycle, possibly dependent on R. The 
utility function thus satisfies the DPE
lT {R f)  = max {ln(/ir i?T)
0< h r <h  *■ J
where
R ^  =  R T~ l
and
hr+ =  hT~l .
VVe shall use Bellman’s [1] Principle of Optimality which states: An optimal pol­
icy has the property that, whatever the initial state and decision (i.e., control) are, 
the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state 
resulting from the first decision.
VVe now proceed iteratively, working backwards in time from the horizon. In the 
terminal period, when r  =  0 , the utility for the fleet is
C /°(fl°)= max (ln(/i0/2°)} =  ln(M2°). 
0<h°<h
Therefore the optimal choice for the h°, is
h° = h .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
When r  =  1 we obtain
U1(R l) = max {\n(hl R l) +  7  • U0(K>)}
Q<hl<h
=  max ( i n ^ f ? 1) + 7  • In f-4/i(l — h l)sfi6') \  
0<hi<a *■ >■ * *
Differentiating (2.2) we obtain
dU 1 1 7 6
dh> V  1 -  
if there is an interior maximum h l . Hence
1
=  0
h l =
1 +  7 6 ’ 
When r  =  2  we obtain
U2(R r)=  max {ln(h2fl2) +  7  • U l(R 1)}
0<h2<h
=  max {ln(/i2f?2) + 7 ln(/il f?1) + 7 2 ln(/i°H0)}
0 </»*<£
=  max / In(hrR2) + 7  ln(-—-—-) +  7  ln(f?1) +  7 2 ln/i -f- 7 2
o<aj<a I I + 7 0
where
=  A(1 -  h2)b(R2)b 
R? =  A(1 -  h l)b(R l)b.
Differentiating (2.3) we obtain
dU2 = 1 7 6  (7  b)2 _
dh2 h2 1 -  h2 1 -  h?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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if there is an interior maximum. Hence
1h2 =
1 +  7 6  +  (76)2  ’
Continuing in this fashion, we obtain
I — 7 6hT =
1 +  7 6  +  (7 ft)2 H 1- (~fb)T 1 — (7 6 )r+ l ’
Letting T  —> 0 0  we find the steady-state harvest proportion to be
h =  1 — 76  (2.4)
since 7 6  < 1 .
We now compute the optimal harvest proportion in a more efficient manner. De­
fine
a r ( R r )  _  dtT{RT)
» { R ) ~  ~ d W ~ -
Then /j. is the marginal unit asset value. We shall also find it useful to define
M T{RT) = R T ■ iiT{RT).
Using induction, we will show that hT and M.r are independent of FT. Suppose, for 
a given r  >  1 , M T+ is independent of FT. We drop the reference to r  and explicitly 
refer to the year only when necessary. The following formulas will be used below,
I t  =  >1(1 -  h f l t ,
b-R+
1 - h '
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Differentiating the right hand side of the DPE (2.1) with respect to h yields
dU  1 _ dR+
dh h + 7 M ' dh 
1 7 - 6
h 1 — h
Let
M +. (2.5)
* - 1 (2'6) 
denote the zero of expression (2.5). By the induction hypothesis, expression (2.6) is
independent of R. The optimal harvest is then either h or is the maximum allowable
harvest h. That is
h =  min[/i, h].
Thus h(R) is a constant, independent of R. VVe now know that
dRV = b • .4(1 -  h ^R ? -1
dR
b-R+
and also note that
R  ’
dU 1 , d R +
d R ~  R *  7  dR  
_  1 7  • 6 • fi+R i'
~ R + R  '
Therefore
M {R )  =  1 +  7 - 6 - (2.7)
also is independent of R. Substituting (2.7) in (2.6) gives
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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We now proceed iteratively. Ia the terminal period, when r  =  0, the optimal choice 
for the h°, is
h° =  h.
and
M ° =  R° • =  1.
Iteration of the recursion equation (2.7) gives
M l =  1 -r yb • M °  =  1 +  7&,
A42 =  1 +  76  • A4l =  1 +  7 6  +  (7 6 )2
,VT =  1 +  7 6  +  (7 6 ) 2 +  • • • +  (7 6 )r =  ■■ .
1 — 7  0
Letting r  —► oc, we find the limiting, time independent relations for the infinite- 
horizon to be
1 — 7 0
h = I - 7 6 , (2 .8 )
the same as in equation (2.4).
The steady-state recruitment, where R — R+, can then be calculated. Assuming 
that h < h we find
R  =  A[(l -  h)R]b 
=  A['fbR\b
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
To summarize, we have found the optimal harvest proportion to be h =  1 — 76  
independent of R  and of .4.
Periodic Growth
We now generalize to a periodically cyclic growth function. In this model the biolog­
ical growth function will cycle through a deterministic sequence of N  distinct growth 
states, n =  0 , 1, . . . , i\f — 1 with
F ( S ,n ) = A n - S b' .
We proceed as before by first examining the finite-time horizon. At the beginning 
of period r ,  the state of the system is [RT,^]. If at a given period, r  > 0, the 
growth state is specified to be rv, then at the subsequent period, =  r  — 1 , the 
corresponding growth state is
n r =  nT+ =  nT~l tnod(iV).
Let hT{n) denote the fleet’s harvested fraction of the accessible stock RT. The 
DPE for the utility function is
IFiiRT, n)] =  max { \n(hrR T) +  7 CT+[(f2T+, n +) ] | . (2.10)
0<h<h 1 J
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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As before we work backwards in time. In the terminal period, when r  =  0, the 
maximal utility is
^ [ ( R 0,*)] =  max 1n(/i°R°) =  In { I r0}
0<h°<h  ̂ J
Hence
_
k  =  k
and
M °  =  R° • n Q =  1
are both independent of the growth state n, and R°.
Suppose for a given r  >  1 that M T+ is independent of IF . Differentiating the
right hand side of the DPE (2.10) with respect to hT yields
=  J L  _  J L ±  . M r * .  ( O H )
dhT h* 1 -  hr K }
The optimal choice for hT is
hT =  min[/iT, hr],
where
hr = ------------------    12.12)
l + 7* 6 » - M T+[ ( ^ , n +)l
is a zero of expression (2.11). Therefore hT is independent of FF. We then write
hT[{RT,n)\ = hT{n).
Differentiating the DPE (2.10)with respect to IF , we find
M T[(RT, n)] =  1 +  7  • * M r+ (2.13)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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which also is independent of IV. We then write
M T{{IV,n)\ =  M T{n).
Substituting equation (2.13) into equation (2 .1 2 ) we obtain
^T(” ) =  T T T T -  v ' M r (n)
Iteration of the recursion equation (2.13)gives 
M x(n) =  1 +  7 6 ,
M 2{n) =  1 +  7 6  • M l {n+) =  1 + 7 bn + T b nbn+,
In the infinite horizon limit
M°°(n) = l+ 'yb nM O0{n+). (2.14)
Iterating expression (2.14) N  times with the subscripts taken mod N, results in
M°°(n)  =  1 + 7 6n +  7 26n6„_l H +■ 7 * M n - i  • • • 6n-.v-iA4°°(n -  AT).
However,
M °°(n -  N)  =
thus,
I +  7&n +  72&n6n-l -1------+  7 ^ - 1&n6n-l * * * 1
1 — 7 Ar[6n&n-l • ‘ * &n-Afl h(n)
We have again found the optimal harvest proportion to be independent of R  and A.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
Stochastic Cases
In the next extension of our model, we introduce stochasticity in the growth function
F[S(f)j =  A(f)S6(t).
The parameters .4(f) and 6(f) in the growth function are now random. The parameter 
6(f) is declared to be a Markovian random variable, chosen from the finite set of values 
6n for n =  1.2. . . .  iV. The sequence of random variables 6(f) form a Markov series 
with single-period transition probability distribution
pro6(6+ =  bm | 6 =  6n) =  pnm.
The growth parameter .4(f) is also random. It will be shown tha t the optimal con­
trol in this model is independent of A(t). As such, we choose A(t) to be a fixed 
deterministic function of 6(f).
We shall consider several variants of the basic model, each variant differing in the 
specific information that each fleet has available when it must make its harvesting 
decision. In describing this information, we adopt the convention that a  stage of the 
dynamic process begins at the time of escapement. The following diagram illustrates 
this.
5  -► AS6 =  R  -> (1 -  h)R  = S + -+ A ~S+b* = FV -> (1 -  h.+)R+
time step
The state variable pair (S , 6) determines recruitment before harvesting is done, while 
the state variable pair (S+, 6+) determine the system after the current harvest. We 
determine the optimal harvest proportion for the following cases.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Knowledge of b
The first case we examine is when the player knows its recruitment but does not know 
the value of next season’s recruitment. In other words, the player knows the current 
value of b and all of its previous values.
As in the deterministic version of our model, we begin with the Snite-horizon 
game. The DPE is
where E  (/(£>+)) is the expectation of /(£>+) given b.b~\b
As before we work backwards in time. In the terminal period, when r  =  0, the 
utility is
are both independent of S° and fi°.
We now prove, using induction, that hT and depend only on b(r). Assume 
that A4r h is independent of RT. The following formulas will be used below.
U[(R, 6)] =  max
0<h(b)<K
In(hR) +~f E  U+[{R+, 6+)j \ , (2.13)
max
0<h°(b)<h
Hence
<**.
h° = h
and
R + =  .4+(l -  h)b+Rl* 
dRT - R + • b+
dh l - h
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Differentiating the utility function (2.9) with respect to h yields
—  =  -
dh h + 7 &+|6 V dh
fdU+ - R + -b + \  
  1 -  h )
h 1 — /l6"r|6 
Setting expression (2.16) equal to zero we obtain
1 7  E (b +M+). (2.16)
~h  i + 7  E{b+ M + y  
6+ |6
The right hand side of equation (2.17) does not depend on R. We now know that
^  =  & - .4 ( l - / i ) fc+R^ - 1
•  r *
R
Differentiating the utility function with respect to R, we find that 
Mr [(R, b)} =  1  ( l  +  7 (6+ • R* ■ m )  )  ,
in other words
M{{R, 6)1. =  1 +  yE^b+M *}.  (2.18)
By the induction hypothesis, the right hand side of (2.18) depends only on b. We then 
write
M[{R,b)] = M {b).
Substituting equation (2.17) in equation (2.18) we obtain
1
h(b) =
M{b)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Iterating (2.18) using M ° =  1 and E[b+ j 6] as the expectation of 6+ given b we obtain
M 1 = l + j  E  {b+M ° ) = 1 4- 7  E[b+ | 6],
M 2 = l +  y  E  {b+Ml{b+)) =  1 +  7 E[b+ | 6] 4- 'fE[b+b++ | b],
6+|6
M 3 =  1 4- 7E[b+ I b] 4- 7 2E[b+b++ j 6] 4- 73£[6+6++6+++ | 6],
If we expand these expressions, we obtain
AT
A/i {bn) =  1 "b 7 ^   ̂Pnmbm
m =i
iV iV ,V
A/i {bn) =  1 4" 7 Pnmbm 4* 7 Pnmbm Pmm'bm' > and SO On.
m= I m = l m' =  l
This series for A400 can be summed. Define the diagonal matrix
B =  [61, 62, • • - 6/v]
and the iV x IV matrices
P  =  [Pnm] and Q =  B P .
Also define the 1 x N  column vectors
1 6i M {bx)
1 62 M{b2 )
1  =
:
, b  =
;
, and M  =
*
1 6iv AA(by)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Then
M °°  =  1 +  7P b  +  7 'P Q b  +  7 3P Q 2b +
=  1 +  7 P [I — 7 Q] b.
Therefore
hT{b = bi) =
1
(2.19)
( i  +  7 P [I ~  7 Q]- l b)i
We have found that the optimal harvest proportion is independent of R. To check 
the above result, we set
1 0
P  =
and bi = bo = b in (2.19). We arrive at
0 1
h =
1 + I—fb 
=  1 -  7  6,
which is the same as in the deterministic case (2.4).
We have found the optimal harvest proportion to be independent of R  and A. We 
have also shown that the deterministic case is a special case of the case when b is 
known.
In the following sections we will calculate optimal harvest fractions for other 
knowledge structures. We will then be able to compare the knowledge structures
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by using the computed control rules in realizations of the model. The results will be 
analyzed and we will explore the qualitative possibilities for the outcome of the game, 
with the focus on the game’s specific knowledge structure.
Knowledge of 6+
We now change the knowledge structure by assuming knowledge of 6+. The DPE is
U[(R, b, 6+)J =  max ( In(hR) +  7  E  U+[(R+, b+, 6++) j l .  (2.20)
0 < /» < £  I  b++\b-r J
In the terminal period, the utility is
t/°[(fl°,6+)] =  max In(h°R°) =  In { h R ° \  .
0<h°<h *
Hence
_
h = h
and
M ° =  #° • n° =  1
are both independent of R°.
For the induction, we assume that A4+ depends only on 6+'r . Differentiating the 
utility function (2 .2 0 ) with respect to h yields
£  £ £ £ .  (2 .2 1 ) 
dh h 6++|6+ I — h
Setting expression (2.21) equal to zero we obtain
1
1 +  7  E  (6+A t+) ' 
6+ + |6+
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Since the right hand side of the above equation depends only on b+, we can conclude 
that h depends only on 6+. Differentiating the utility function (2.20) with respect to 
R, we find that
M(fl, 6+)l =  i  ( l  +  y b * ^  O ! ) )  .
equivalently
6+>] = 1 + y b *  E  O ] ) .  (2.22)
6‘M“[o+
By the induction hypothesis, the right hand side of (2.22) depends only on 6T. We 
can then write
M [(R ,6+)] =  M{b+).
Substituting equation (2.21) into equation (2.22) we obtain
Iterating expression (2.22), using M °  =  1 
A4l (6+) =  1 -1- 7 6 +,
M 2 (b+) =  1 - F 7 6+  - r  726+ £ [ 6+ +  | 6+ ],
A43(6+) =  1 +  7 6 + +  7 26+£,[6++ [ 6+] +  7 36+£[6++6++^ | 6+], and so on. The 
limiting value can be expressed as
,Vt°°(6+) =  1 +  7 6+ (1 +  7 ^ [6++ | 6+] +  7 2E[b++b+ +  +  | 6+] +  • • •)
= 1 + 7b+ (1 + 7P[I -  7Q]'lk+) •
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The optimal harvest fractions are thus given by
h(6+ =  bi) =
(1 +  7b+ (1 +  7P[I -  7Ql-ir ) ) j'
Again, to check, we set
P  =
1 0  
0 1
and b\ =  bn =  6 in (2.23). The result is
h =
1 + 7 6 ( 1  +  1^ 5) 
1
1 4-  ~!bL • I-76
(2.23)
=  1 -  7 6 ,
which is the same as in the deterministic case eqrefE.Td.
We have found the optimal harvest proportion to be independent of R  and .4. We 
have also shown that the deterministic case is a special case of the case when b* is
known.
Knowledge of b
In the next version of our model, we assume only delayed knowledge of the stock 
recruitment growth parameters. To ease calculations, we now use S  as the state 
variable. The DPE is
[(£  O l  = m a x {  E  (1n(hSb) +  7 ^ [ ( S + , &)]) 1 • (2.24)
0<h<h 11>\<>~ J
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When t  =  0 it is cleax again that h° = k. Hence the m axim um  utility is
U°[(S°,b-)] = E _  (ln(hS°6)) .
We define
and
Then
A0 =  E  ^  
b\b-S°
or
A0 =  E[b | 6"].
Again we note that A0 and h° depend only on b~. For the induction proof, we assume 
that A+ depends only on b. The following formulas will prove useful.
S + = .4(1 -  h)Sb
as+ s+
dh 1 — h
Differentiating the utility function (2.24) with respect to h gives
(2.25)
d U = E
dh  6|6-  \ h  1 — h )
h 1 — hb\b-
7  E  A+. (2.26)
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Setting equation (2.26) equal to zero, we obtain
1h =
1 + 7  E  A+ ' 
616 -
independent of 5. We now know that
8 S + bS+ 
dS ~  S  *
Differentiating the DPE (2.24) with respect to S, leads to
or
A i ( S ,b - ) ] = E  (6 +• 7 &A+[(S+, 6)]) .
0)0 “
Iterating (2.29), it is evident that A is independent of 5. We obtain
Al (6~) =  E  [6(1 +  7 £[6+ | 6])] =  E[b +  7 66+ | 6~],
6)6 “
A2(6“ ) =  E[b +  7 66+ +  7 266+6++ | 6"].
In the limit as r  —> oo
A°°(6~) =  E[b +  7 66+ +  7 266+6++ -f | 6~],
likewise
A°°(6) =  E[b* +  7 6+6^  +  7 26+6++6+++ +  • • • | 6].
Therefore
£[A ~(6) | 6- [  =  E[b+ +  7 6+6++ +  • • • | 6~] =  P 2[I -  7 Q]_ lb.
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(2.27)
(2.29)
(2.30)
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Substituting expression (2.27) in expression (2.30), we obtain
h{b = k)  =  ( l + ' / P n i - T Q I - 'b - ) /  t2'31)
As a check, we set P  =  I  and bi =  62 =  b in (2.31). The result is
h = ----------------
=  1 -  7 „6 ,
which is the same as in the deterministic case eqrefErla.
We have found the optimal harvest proportion to be independent of R  and A. We 
have also shown that the deterministic case is a special case of the case when b~ is 
known.
Numerical Simulation Results
In this section we compare the different knowledge structures using numerical simu­
lations of the models. We obtain explicit quantitative results regarding the harvest 
proportions and the expected payoffs. We use the following notations for the differeut 
knowledge structures.
b - knowledge of b~
b knowledge of b
b+ knowledge of h*
In the figures we display W , the historically preferred utility function. Specifically,
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we set
W  =  exp[(l -  7 )U] (2.32)
=  exp < E  Inj i J l n  f t r - w  J
where
«t( 7) =  (1 - 7 ) 7 £-
T hat is, W ,  is a weighted geometric mean of the harvests.
The following is a realization of 10000 simulations each fifty years long. The 
average of W is given for each knowledge structure. The independent variable is 61, 
one of the two possible growth rates.
In F ig u re  2.1 we see that the economic return is higher, in the sole manger model, 
when the fleet has more knowledge concerning the stochastic parameters. We also 
see the return is lowered when the biological growth is poorer.
In F ig u re  2.2 we see the management of the stock can be more aggressive when 
the manager has additional information.
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Chapter 3
C om petitive Fishery
We now wish to examine the impact of information on the competitive fishery. Here 
the interaction between the competing fleets leads to more interesting outcomes of 
the game. As before, we first start with a deterministic model before proceeding to 
the stochastic cases.
Deterministic Case
We start with the purely autonomous version of our deterministic model. Two fishing 
fleets, the a-fleet and the /3-fleet, compete over the harvest of a single fish stock. The 
life-cycle of the fish is illustrated in the diagram below.
R  =  Ra Sa =  (1 -  =  Re -»• Sf} =  (1 -  hp)Rff =  5  -> R+ = F (5 ).
31
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
At the beginning of the harvesting season, the total fish-stock biomass is available only 
to the a-fleet. The a-fleet harvests the proportion ha of this stock. The remaining 
unharvested stock, Sa becomes available for the /3-fleet to harvest. The ,5-fleet, in 
turn, takes the proportion h$ of its accessible stock Rp, leaving the local escapement
s9.
After each fleet has harvested their proportion of available stock, the total es­
capement, equivalent to the /3-fleet’s local escapement, is some fraction of the initial 
recruitment R. Thus,
S  =  <tR  where a  =  (1 — ha)( 1 — h^).
The total escapement then spawns, providing the subsequent season’s recruitment 
R+. Our competitive model leads to the following DPE
T
UV[RV I h0\ = 7 * Infh,,/?,,] for u =  a  or /3.
£=0
Note that this scenario is not neutral with respect to the two fleets since the fish stock 
available for harvesting is always larger for the a  fleet.
Each fleet is assumed to have complete knowledge of the structure of the game, 
including the growth function and the initial recruitment. Both fleets know their 
competitor’s objective function as well as their own. The individual fleet then wishes 
to maximize its objective function by optimally choosing a harvest proportion for 
each year. Each fleet chooses a policy that is the optimal response by that fleet to 
the policy it expects will be chosen by its opponent.
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A Nash-equilibrium policy pair is a pair of policies, one chosen by each fleet, such 
that each is the optimal response by that fleet to the policy it expects to be chosen 
by its opponent. In other words, each fleet can not improve their yield once the other 
fleet commits to its policy. If such a pair of policies exist, the model is said to have 
a solution.
Our goal is then to find, if it exists, a Nash-equilibrium point for each year that 
the harvesting game is played. This can be done by choosing the harvest value hi 
for each t € 0 . . .  T. VVe then take the limit as T  —> oo to find a time-independent 
solution. When this happens we say the game has an infinite time-horizon.
We use standard reaction analysis to calculate the Nash-equilibrium policy pair. 
Let us denote the competitor to the i/-fleer. by p. that is P =  0  or a  when u =  a  or 
/3 respectively. At any time t, and conditional on h?, the P-fleet’s value function for 
the infinite time-horizon satisfies the dynamic programming equation
Uu[ R v \ h e\ =  max_{ln(/il/i2„) +~tvUu[R* j /# ] } .  (3.1)
0 <A„<A„
We now proceed iteratively, working backwards in time from the horizon. In the 
terminal period, when r  =  0 , the utility for the t/-fleet is
UQM \ h * \ =  max, { ln ( /iX )}  =  ^ X ) »
0</»°<A„
independent of any action taken by the competing P-fleet. Therefore the optimal 
choice for the hi, is
hi  =  K ,
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and
Note for v — a  or ,8 , hi and M l  are independent of the recruitment R l  and of the 
competitor’s policy hQ0. Using induction, we will show that hTu and M l  are indepen­
dent of R l and of the competitor’s policy
Suppose, for a given r  > 1 , M rJ  is independent of R l- The following formulas 
will be used below.
f i j  =  .4(1 -  h , ) \ l  -  M X  
o n °. =  . A(i  _  haf ~ ^ X _  * ,)* /£
dha
b R Z
1 - h a
Differentiating the right hand side of the DPE (3.1) with respect to ha yields
dUa = _1_ ^  + d R t
dha h ,  ' /“W» ' dha
Let
aa — . , 7 TT~ (3-3)1 -r 7 q • 0 • M a
denote the zero of expression (3.2). By the induction hypothesis, expression (3.3) is
independent of Ra and h$. The optimal harvest is then either ha or is the maximum
allowable harvest ha. That is
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Thus ha(Ra | hg) is a constant, independent of Ra and hg. We now know that
^  =  b • A(1 -  ha)b( 1 -  hfi)bt i t l
dRa
b - R j  
R a '
and also note that
f t f /a =  1 +dR+
dR a Ra l a ' d R a
_  J _  , l a ' b '  /J-Z R-g 
Ra T i?a
Therefore
M a(Ra \hg) = l + y b - M t  (3.4)
also is independent of Ra and h£. Substituting (3.4) in (3.3) gives
' ‘° =  T T
Iteration of the recursion equation (3.4) gives 
M la =  1 +  yab • A4° =  1 +  j ab,
M \  =  1 + 7 ab- M l  =  1 +  Jab +  (jab) 2
1 _  Mr+l
M l  =  1 +  7a6 +  (Ta6 )2 +  — +  (7a6)r  =  ■.
1 -  Jab
Letting r  —► oo, we find the limiting, time independent relations for the infinite-
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horizon to be
1
=
1 - 7 *b'
ha =  1 -  7 a&. (3.5)
For the /3 fleet we obtain the following formulas
R ; = A ( , l - h s )bR i ( l - h * ) ,  
dR +
=  6 • A(1 -  hg)u{l -  ha ) ^ 8
b - R t
Ra '
Using the same induction hypothesis and differentiating the right hand side of the 
DPE (3.1) with respect to hg yields
dUa 1 , dR%
dhg hg +  ' dhg
i  l a ' b  . +
= r s - — / M ’ - '■3Sl
Let
he =  — ----- -7—77+ (3.7!1 +  Jg • 6 • M g
denote the zero of expression (3.6). By the induction hypothesis, expression (3.7) is
independent of Rg and ha. Thus hg(Rg | ha) is a constant, independent of Rg and
ha. We now know that
9R * =  6 • A(1 -  A+)(l -
dRg
b
" Rg ’
-R+
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and also note that
dUp _  1 +dR+
dRp Rp 1 0  ' dRp 
_  1 , 7p -b -  p^Rp
Rp Rp
Therefore
M p(Rp \ k a) = l  + 7 -b -M %  (3.8)
also is independent of Rp and ha. Substituting (3.8) in (3.7) gives
so
hp =  1 -  7 5 6 . (3.9)
The steady-state recruitment, where R  =  R+, can then be calculated. Assuming that
R  = A [ ( l - h a) { l - h p )R } b 
=  A[yalrypbR\b
or
R  =  A & ( 7 a7 p6? )rh . (3.10)
The value of a single year’s harvest, CompValu, is then
CompVala — In ^(1  — 7 Q6)A1̂  (yaypb2) ̂  ̂
CompValp =  in ^(1  — 7 ^6) (1 — 'yQb ) A ^  {yaypb2) ^ ^  .
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The total value of a single year’s harvest, CompVal, is therefore
CompVal =  In ( ( 1  -  yab)2(l -  ^ p b ) A ^ .
Summarizing our work for the deterministic model, we have found that the opti­
mal steady-state harvest fraction is independent of both the recruitment R u and the 
opponents policy hp. The optimal harvest fraction was found to be
/iy -~ 1 *yi/b.
We note that this is the same expression as we found before in the sole manager 
model (2.4).
Periodic Growth
We now generalize to a periodically cyclic growth function. In this model the biolog­
ical growth function will cycle through a deterministic sequence of N  distinct growth 
states, n =  0 ,1 , . . . ,  N  — 1 with
F (S ,n) = -4n • S bn.
We proceed as before by first examining the finite-time horizon. At the beginning 
of period r , the state of the system is [i£T, rv].
Let hl(n)  denote the i/-fleet’s harvested fraction of the accessible stock FCV. The 
DPE for the utility function is
UZ[{Rl, n) | h;] =  max_ { ln(h;iC ) +  7 ,C / f  [ ( * f , n +) | h f ] }  . (3.11)
Q<hr<hr 1 1
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As before we work backwards in time. In the terminal period, when r  =  0, the 
maximal utility for the i/-fleet is
! A!] =  max H W )  = In ( M g !  .
0<h°<h„ J
Hence
h l = h u
and
M l  = E?v -n l  = 1
are both independent of the growth state n, h% and i?°.
Suppose for a given r  > I that M l*  is independent of Rl. Differentiating the 
right hand side of the DPE (3.11) with respect to h i  yields
dUl 1 7a -b +
T = T Z ' m ° -  (3 -12)
The optimal choice for h i  is
h i  =  m in fe , hi],
where
i r — _______________i_______________ n  i t
“ 1 +  7a • b n M ?  [(Rl*, hl+, n+) | K \
is a zero of expression (3.12). Therefore hTa is independent of R l  and hi- We then
write
i m  =  K in ) .
Differentiating the DPE (3.11) with respect to R l,  we find
M Ta[(Kl, n) | hi] =  1 +  7  * 6n • M l*  (3.14)
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which also is independent of FCa and hT&. We then write
M l H K . n )  I Ail =  M l(n ) .  
Substituting equation (3.14) into equation (3.13) we obtain
"  A i k ) '
Iteration of the recursion equation (3.14)gives 
M la{n) =  1 +7a&,
M l  (n) =  1 +  7 ab- jVI* (n+) =  1 +  yabn +  ~i2abnbn+,
In the infinite horizon limit
A 1“ (n) =  1 + y a b n M a ( n + ) .  (3.15)
Iteration of the expression (3.15) N  times with the subscripts taken mod N, results 
in
M ^ { n )  =  1 +  7abn +  7a&n6n-i +  • • • +  7a 6n6n-i • • * b n - t f - i M ^ i n  -  N ) .  
However,
M ? { n  -  N)  =  M ? (n ) ,
thus,
W oc, _  * +  7 Q n̂ 7 q b n b n - i  -i b  7 ^ ~ l 6w5n- t  • • • 6n-iV-1 1
 ̂ “ 1 -  ^[bnbn-i  * • • &„_*■] ha(n ) '
The calculations for the 0  fleet are similar and lead to the same result. We have 
shown the optimal harvest proportion to be independent of R  and A.
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Stochastic Cases
In the next extension of our model, we introduce stochasticity in the growth function
F[S{t) ] =  A(t)Sbit).
We adopt the convention that a stage of the dynamic process begins at the time of 
total seasonal escapement and ends at the specification of player ft's escapement. 
Note that even though S3  =  S+, we consider S 3 to be in the season prior to the total 
escapement. The following diagram illustrates this.
S  —> A S b = Ra Sa = R 6 -> S3 =  -> A+S +b* =  R t  S J  =  R t  -» S t
P time step °  “  9 J
The state variable pair (5 ,6) determines recruitment before harvesting is done, while 
the state variable pair (S+ , 6+) determine the system after the current harvest.
Knowledge of b
The first case we examine is when both players know their recruitment but do not 
know the value of next season’s recruitment. In other words, both players know the 
current value of b and all of its previous values. In addition both players, after having 
calculated their optimal harvest fractions, will be able to deduce the value S 3 .
As in the deterministic version of our model, we begin with the finite-horizon 
game. The DPE for the a-fleet is
Ua[(Ra,b) | =  max^ ( l n ^ i ^ )  +'Ya E U £ [ ( i £ , 6+) | , (3.16)
0 < /ia < A a  I  &+|4 J
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where E  (/(o+) | 6) is the expectation of / ( 6+) given 6 .
6+|6
As before we work backwards in time. In the terminal period, when r  =  0 , the 
utility for the ^-fleet is
U°[(Rl,b) \h%\=  max ln(h°R°u) =  In {h„Rl \  .
Hence
hl = hv
and
are both independent of /i°, S° and
We now prove, using induction, that hi  and Adi depend only on 6(r). Assume 
that M *  is independent of R„. The following formulas will be useful.
R+ =  A+(l -  hfi)b+R£ =  A+(l -  hfi)b+(l -
dR+ - R j - b +  
dha 1 — ha
Differentiating the utility function (3.16) with respect to ha yields
dUa _ J . + 7  E ( dU i
ha ab+\b V 9ha 1 -  ha )dha
1 7a
ha 1 — hab+\b 
Setting expression (3.17) equal to zero we obtain
E (b +M t ) .  (3.17)
ha i + l a E ( b * M t y  (3 -18)
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The right hand side of equation (3.18) does not depend on R a or h$. We now know 
that
d R t
dRa
b+ -R
R*
Differentiating the utility function with respect to Ra, we find that
I M  =  JQ  ( 1  + 7 .  £ s (b* ■ K  ■ t i m . b * )  ! A J])) .
in other words
| h,\ =  1 + 7 .  (3.19)
By the induction hypothesis, the right hand side of (3.19) depends only on b. We then 
write
M a[(Ra,bi) | hfi] =  M a.
Substituting equation (3.18) in equation (3.19) we obtain
* ■ - £
Iterating (3.19) using M l  =  1 an<i  E[b+ | 6] as the expectation of b+ given b we 
obtain
M la =  1 +  7a E  {b+M°a) =  1 +  i aE[b+ I 6],
6+|6
M l  =  1 +  7« E  (b + M l(b +))  =  1 +  i aE[b* 1 6] +  7lE[b+b+*  | 61,
6+[6
M l  =  1 +  7*E[b+ I 6] +  ~(lE[b+b++ | 6] +  t* £ [6 +&++6+++ | 6],
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A C  =  1 +  7aP b  +  TaPQb -f- 7«PQ 2b 
= l + 7 a P [ I - 7 aQ]~lb.
Therefore
44
hTa(b =  bi) = (3.20)( l+ 7 a P [I -7 a Q ]- lb ) /
For the /3-fleet, we can calculate its harvest fraction similarly. The induction proof 
that hg and M Tg depend only on b(r) is identical to the previous proof.
USHtTf.b) I /£) = max (lnfhJflS) + 1 ,  E jr3*{(Rf, 6+) | C l )  ■
0 < h l< h g  1 b+\b v  J
The following formulas apply.
B$ =  >1(1 -  k„)Rt  =  .4(1 -  /i„)(l -
3R J - t $  • b*
dfi6 1 - h *
Differentiating the utility function with respect to hg, yields
d U f
dhg - — I- ~fg Ehg 6+|6
1 IB
d U j  - / £ - 6 +
dhg I -  hg
hg 1 — hg ft+ii§ p * * v \ (3.21)
Setting expression (3.21) equal to zero we obtain
h» — (3.22)
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The right hand side of equation (3.22) does not depend on R$ or ha, therefore 
depends only on b. We now know that
dRg _ R j - b +
dRfj R$
Differentiating the utility function with respect to R$, we find that
R , , b \ h . )  =  j -  ( l + y e E ^ - R Z - r i U R ^ b * )  | h*]) \  ,
in other words
M fK R n , b) | M  =  1 +  73  £  b*) i /£ ] ) .  (3.23)
0  ̂|o
The induction hypothesis shows that the right hand side of the expression (3.23) 
depends only on b. Substituting equation (3.23) into equation (3.22), we obtain
-  * 5 0 )
The iteration process leads to the result
■M”  =  1 +  7flPfI — 7aQ]~lb.
We have found that the optimal harvest proportion is independent of Ru and of 
ho. The optimal harvest fraction is
^ l + 7 , P [ I - T , Q | - b V  (3'24)
We note that this expression is the same as in the sole manager case (2.19).
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Knowledge of 6+
We now change the knowledge structure by assuming both fleets have knowledge of 
The DPE for the a  -fleet is
Ua[(Ra,b ,b + )\h 0 }=  max: ( ln (M 2 a) + 7a E  U Z [{K ,b +^ ) \  h j jV  (3.25)
0<Ao <Aa I  6++16+ "  J
In the terminal period, the utility for the i/-fleet is
6+ ) | h°] =  max ln(A°/?°) =  In .
0<A° <Aa '
Hence
hl = hu
and
M l  = R l - v l  = I
are both independent of h% and
For the induction, we assume that M *  depends only on 6++. Differentiating the 
utility function (3.25) with respect to ha yields
dha ha a6++|6+ 1 — hQ 
Setting expression (3.26) equal to zero we obtain
Since the right hand side of the above equation depends only on b+, we can conclude 
that ha depends only on b+. Differentiating the utility function (3.25) with respect
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to R a, we find that
M W . ,  b+) I A«] =  ( l + 7 t e U n Z . b * * )  I A ?])) ,
equivalently
&-) I M  =  1 +  lab* E (M*l(R^,  6++) I A+]). (3.27)
By the induction hypothesis, the right hand side of (3.27) depends only on 6+. We 
can then write
Substituting equation (3.26) into equation (3.27) we obtain
^  =  M J F - y
Iterating expression (3.27), using = I 
^ ( & +) =  I+7a& +,
M 2a{b+) =  1 + 7 a6+ +lib+E[b++ | b+],
M%(b+) =  1 +  7 a&+ +  'yZb+E[b++ | 6+] +  7 3&+£[6++6+++ | b+J, and so on. The 
limiting value can be expressed as
M ?(b+) =  1 +  7a&+ (1  +  yaE[b++ I b+l 4- 7 lE[b++b+  +  +  | 6+] +  • • •)
=  1  +  7ab“ (1 +  7aP(I -  7aQ]-lb+) ■
The optimal harvest fraction is given by
M 6 +  =  6'') =  ( l + 7 a b + ( l + 7 a P ( I - 7 a Q l- ‘t r ) ) ;  (3'28)
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The calculations for the #-fleet lead to the same result for hTQ. We note that the 
optimal harvest proportion is independent of R  and A  and that the above expression 
(3.28) is the same as in the sole manager case (2.23).
Knowledge of b~
In the next version of our model, we assume that both fleets have only delayed 
knowledge of the stock recruitment growth parameters. To ease calculations, we now 
use S  as the state variable. The DPE for the a-fleet is
U.V.S, n  I M  =  m»x (  E  (ln(A„Ss) +  7atC [(S + , i) I fc ji))  . (3.29)
0<ha<ha L6!6- J
When r  =  0 it is clear again that h°Q =  ha. Hence the utility for the a-fleet is 
We define
a ;[ (5 ’6-) I hj] =  A u „ n s ,b - )  I M
and
A „ [(S ,r ) |M  =  5A [(S ,6-)|h9].
Then
A“ =  ajf-5°
or
A l  =  E[b | »-).
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Again we note that A° and /i° depend only on b~. For the induction proof, we assume 
that A+ depends only on b. The following formulas will prove useful.
5+ =  .4(1 -  hQ)( l  -  h0 )Sb
dS+- S + 
dha 1 -  ha
Differentiating the utility function (3.29) with respect to ha gives
dUag _  E  f  J_  _  i an tS + \
dhg 6|6- \ h a 1 -  ha J
=    E  A t.
ha I - h a 616-
Setting equation (3.31) equal to zero, we obtain
1
independent of S  and h$. We now know that
dS+ bS+ 
d S  ~  S  '
Differentiating the DPE (3.29) with respect to S, leads to
or
(3.30)
(3.31)
^  =  7“  FTT> (3-32)
Aa((S, b-) I h ,  1 - E ( b  + 1 „6AJ [(S+, b) I AJD ■ (3.34)b\b'“
Iterating (3.34), it is evident that Aa is independent of S . We obtain
Ai(4") =  E  [6(1 +  7»JS[6+ I 6])] =  E[b +  la bb* | &-],
6(6
A j(6- )  =  E[b +  7 o66+ +  ^bb+b** | 6"].
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In the limit as r  —>• 00
A~(6~) =  E[b +  7 a66+ +  'ylbb+b** + • • • ( 6~],
likewise
A ~ ( 6) =  £ [ 6+  +  ^ b + b ^  +  7 l b +b++b ^  +  • • • j 6].
Therefore
£[A“ (i<) I r ]  =  £ [6+ +  7 a6+6++ H I 6-] =  P 2[I -  T o Q r 'b . (3.35)
Substituting expression (3.32) in expression (3.35), we obtain
H ‘ { b  = W =  ( I  +  T s P n i - T . Q l - ' b - ) /
The DPE for the /?-fleet is
m s ,  n  i a«] =
max (  E  (In ( (1  - A 0)(l -  he )S>) + 7 „U }l(S*,b) | ( £ ] ) !  (3.36) 
Q<h0 <hg L6!6*  J
n ^When r  =  0 it is clear again that =  hp. Hence the utility for the ,5-fleet is
03[(S°,4-) I a;i = E (in(KMs*)")) ■
Then
or
\0  __ p  ^
9 »£-S°
A? =  £ ( 6  | 6 '] .
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Again we note that Ajj and depend only on b~. For the induction proof, we assume 
that Xp depends only on b. The following formulas will be used.
S + =  A(1  -  ha )( l -  hp)Sb 
dS+ s +
dhp I — h$
Differentiating the utility function (3.36) with respect to h$ gives
dUj3_ _  E  (  1 W t s+  
dh$ 6|6- I h# 1 -  hff
1 73
h$ I -  he b\b- 3 
Setting equation (3.38) equal to zero, we obtain
1
(3.37)
E  A t. (3.38)
1 + 7 .E .A J
independent of 5  and ha. We now know that
d S + bS+ 
d S  ~  S  '
Differentiating the DPE (3.36) with respect to S, leads to
( b fn0XtS+'
or
A„[(S, b-) | A J =  E  (b + 7«6AJ[(S+, b) | >£]) . (3.41)
6|6
We note that the expressions are the same for the /J-fleet as the a-fleet. We can 
conclude the expression for h$ is similar to the expression for ha. The optimal harvest
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
fractions are given by
^  = b‘] = ( l  +  7 ,P 2[ I - 7 , Q ] - ‘b - ) j ' (3 '42)
We note that the optimal harvest proportion (3.42) is independent of R  and A  and 
is the same as in the sole manager case (2.31).
Asymmetric Knowledge
We now consider an asymmetric version of the model. Here, the two fleets will have 
different knowledge of the stochastic growth parameters. In our previous work, we 
have demonstrated that the ^-fleet’s harvest policy was completely independent of 
the ^-fleet's policy. All of the calculations are identical. We can conclude that the 
harvest proportions for the v-fleet in the asymmetric game is equal to the harvest 
proportion for the i/-fleet in the symmetric game.
Numerical Simulation Results
In this section we compare the different knowledge structures by running simulations. 
We use the following notations for the different knowledge structures.
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b - symmetric knowledge of b~
b symmetric knowledge of 6
b+ symmetric knowledge of 6+
b — vb asymmetric knowledge, a  knows b~,p  knows 6
b — vb+ asymmetric knowledge, a  knows b~ , 0  knows 6+
bvb— asymmetric knowledge, a  knows 6 , knows b~
bvb+ asymmetric knowledge, a  knows 6 , /3 knows 6+
b + vb— asymmetric knowledge, a  knows 6+, knows b~
b + vb asymmetric knowledge, a  knows b+,fi knows 6
The following is a realization of 10000 simulations each fifty years long. The average of 
W, the historically preferred utility function, (see (2.32)) is given for each knowledge 
structure. The independent variable is 61.
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F ig u re  3.1 Here we look at the symmetric knowledge cases. Player one, Pa 
receives a higher utility with additional knowledge. However, P3 performs worse with 
additional knowledge.
Ot2r 
a it  - 
a t  ■ 
a  09 - 
0.08 - 
ao7- 
aoe -
aos -
|4« ' ' I '  1 1 » 1 — ■ ■ * 1
OJ 092 09* 098 091 0 9  092 09* 099
0!
Figure 3.1: Comparison of Wa with W$
- "pi
■ - *„«»
■- "pi 
"pi
-■ "pi
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Figures 3.2, 3.3. 3.4 Here we examine asymmetric knowledge. Pa has the same 
knowledge within each figure, whereas P$ s knowledge is allowed to vary. In these 
figures, Pq performs better with additional knowledge. However, Pa's return decreases 
when P$ gains this additional knowledge.
a t2 r
a n  * "* ~ ~ 7 ^
a a*
i at*
0.07 -
aoe -
a o a a  082 a s *  o m  o.m  a *  a  *2 a . u  a s *ot
Figure 3.2: Comparison of Wa with W$ when /3-fleet knowledge is increasing
• - w.ffTvei 'MJB'lO")
- %«n
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0.00
0.0 094
Figure 3.3: Comparison of Wa with Wg when /3-fleet knowledge is increasing
01
0.07
at att91 09 094
Figure 3.4: Comparison of Wa with Wg when /3-fleet knowledge is increasing
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Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 Here the situation is reversed. P$ has the same knowledge 
within each figure, whereas Pa’s knowledge is allowed to vary. In these figures, Pa 
performs better with additional knowledge. However, Pp's return decreases when Pa 
gains this additional knowledge.
a n
a t
a o s
a*
a s
Figure 3.5: Comparison of Wa with W$ when a-fleet knowledge is increasing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
0.12
0.0* -
W,®‘<0|
v»4(#-,bi
w,(t>'vO|
OS 082 0.44 ass
81
Figure 3.6: Comparison of Wa with Wg when a-fleet knowledge is increasing
a n
at
aot
a as
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of Wa with Wg when a-fleet knowledge is increasing
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F ig u re  3.8 This figure shows the various harvest rates for the different knowledge 
structures and different values of b. When the b value is b\ (indicating poor growth) 
the harvest fractions are lower than when b is 62- However the ordering based on 
knowledge is inverted when b is changed from b\ to 62- In other words, since the 
utility function is risk-averse, with poor knowledge the players tend to be conservative. 
However, if the player has a high degree of knowledge the two harvest rates will be 
further apart than if the player possesses a lesser degree of knowledge, indicating the 
player takes a more aggressive approach to harvesting. This in turn benefits the first
player since he is in the position to harvest first.
0.7 p
AM *
A l - 
AM 
0.5 -
A48 • ' * * * ' -  _ _
A* •
AM  -
QJ I- .. -■ ■ . >.............J  . - —■ t 1 i i I ■ ■ .. Im 1 ■ - - J
A* A M  AM  A M  AM  A t AM  AM  AM0!
Figure 3.8: Comparison of harvest proportions for the two possible states of b
- * Mtltt
-
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Chapter 4
Fairness
Until now, the a-fleet has had an inherent advantage in the fishery. We may wonder 
if there is a way to address this issue by limiting the a-fleet’s harvest. Suppose that 
the a  fleet has only a fraction, 5, of R  available for harvesting. We show what effects 
this added variant will has on the outcome of the game and determine what value of 
5 equalizes the game.
Determ inistic Case
We start with the purely autonomous version of our deterministic model. Two fishing 
fleets, the a-fleet and the /3-fleet, compete over the harvest of a single fish stock. The
60
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life-cycle of the fish is illustrated in the diagram below.
S  —► A S b -> Ra =  8 A S b -* Sa
\  \
— y R 0  = ( I -  8 )A Sb +  Sa -> S* =  S +
The a-fleet’s utility function thus satisfies the DPE
Ua[ S \h g \=  max {ln(6 haA S b) +'yaU*[S+ \ h t]}  . (4.1)
0< h a < h a
We now proceed iteratively, working backwards in time from the horizon. In the 
terminal period, when r  =  0 , the utility for the a-fleet is
U«[S° I *Sl =  max {ln(<S/i°AS0*)} =  ln(ctoQAS°4).
Therefore the optimal choice for the , is
h°a = h a,
and
A° =  6 ,
independent of any action taken by the /3-fleet. Using induction, we will again show 
that hTa and are independent of ST and of the competitor’s policy h^.
Suppose, for a given r  >  1, A j is independent of S. The following formulas will
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Sa =
dS+
dK
1 -  ha)5AS 
1 -  S)ASb + Sa 
1 -  5ha)A Sb
1 -  5h*)( 1 -  hp)ASb =  SH 
- 6 S+
l - 5 h a)'
Differentiating the right hand side of the DPE (4.1) with respect to ha yields
dUa
dha
1 7o*A£
1 -  Shc
(4.2)
Let
ha = (4.3)
3(i + 7 « a ; )
denote the zero of expression (4.2). By the induction hypothesis, expression (4.3) is 
independent of S  and h$. We now know that
dS+ bS+ 
dS  ~  S
and also note that
Therefore
dS  S  7  S  '
K ( S \ h t ) = b(l + yaA*) (4.4)
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also is independent of S  and h$. Substituting (4.4) in (4.3) gives
ha = u
Iteration of the recursion equation (4.4) gives
\ la =  6(1 +  7 a6A°) = 6(1 +  7 a6),
Aq =  6(1 +  70&A£) =  6(1 +  7q6(1 +  7 a 6))
=  6(1 +  7a 6 +  7lb2)
Letting r  -> oo, we find the limiting, time independent relations for the infinite- 
horizon to be
A ~ =  6
a 1 7a6'
-  _  1 - 7a6
ha — . (4.5)
As a check, if 5 =  1 in the above equation then
h<x = 1 7a6,
the same result as previously obtained in the sole manager case (2.4). 
The ^-fleet’s utility function satisfies the DPE
Uff[Sr | ha] =  max {Info,AS6) + 7 ^ [ S + | /£ ]} . (4.6)
The optimal choice for the /$ , is
h°p =  hp,
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and
\ \ = b,
independent of any action taken by the a-fleet. Using induction, we will again show 
that hff and A# are independent of S  and of the competitor’s policy ha.
Suppose, for a given r  >  1 , is independent of 5 . Using
d S + —S+
dhe ~  (1 - h 0y
and differentiating the right hand side of the DPE (4.6) with respect to h3 yields
dU3  _  1 .+ d S +
dh3 h3 +  1 3  0 dh3
=  J _  _
h3 1 — h3
Let
(4.7)
h  =  ■:---------- r x  (4.8)i+7 /J 'A j
denote the zero of expression (4.7). By the induction hypothesis, expression (4.8) is 
independent of S  and ha. We now know that
dS+ bS+
dS
and also note that
Therefore
dU3  b A 
d S  S +7/J S '
A^(5 | ha) =  6(1 +  7#A£) (4.9)
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also is independent of S  and ha. Iterating the recursion equation (4.9) we find
a ~  =  - A _
3 1-7/J& ’
h$ =  1 —  7pb.
The steady-state escapement, where R  — R+, can then be calculated. Assuming
t ty  ^  t ty
R  = A [ ( l - 6 ha) ( l - h 0 )R}b.
Therefore
R  = A ^ ( l  -  d*ha) i ^ ( l  -  h (})tt  
= .4^5 (ya^ b 2) ^
The harvest levels are
Ya =  haSR 
=  ( 1 - 7 ab)R 
%  =  he{l -  5ha)R  
=  (1  -  ifib)iabR.
If we try to solve Ya =Yp  we find it impossible to equalize this game by adjusting <5. 
However if hu > hv
R  = A [ { l - 5 h a) { l - h f i ) R \b.
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Therefore
R  =  A ^ {  1 -  5ha)-&{ 1 -
=  A ^  ( 7 ^ ( 1  - ^ a ) ) ^
The harvest levels are then
fa  =  5haR  
Y? =  h&{ 1 -
=  ( l - 7 ^ ) ( l - 5 h a ) ^ .
In this case
j  1 -  7<6 
(2  -
equalizes the game.
We have shown that the optimal harvest proportion is independent of R  and .4. 
The harvest proportion is the same as calculated in the sole manager case (2.4). 
Therefore the 6  constraint can not equalize the game unless the first player’s optimal 
harvest proportion is is constrained by h.
Stochastic Cases 
Knowledge of b
The first case we examine is when both players know their recruitment but do not 
know the value of next season’s recruitment. In other words, both players know the
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current value of b and all of its previous values. In addition both players, after having 
calculated their optimal harvest fractions, will be able to deduce the value S3 .
As in the deterministic version of our model, we begin with the finite-horizon 
game. The DPE for the a  -fleet is
Ua[(S,b) | hg] = max^ / \n(5haA Sr‘) + 7 a E  ^ [ ( 5 + ,6+) | h j ] \  . (4.10)
0<ha(b)<ha I J
As before we work backwards in time. Again
hl = hu
and
A° = b
are both independent of and 5°.
We now prove, using induction, that h i and A£ depend only on b. Differentiating 
the utility function (4.10) with respect to ha yields
dU* 1 ^  r  f ^ dS+\
dha ha 6+|6
1 7a<* E ( K ) .  (4.11)ha 1 —JhQ6+|6 
Setting expression (4.11) equal to zero we obtain
h .  =  (4.12)
H1+7a4 (AJ)j
The right hand side of equation (4.12) does not depend on S  ot hg. We now know 
that
dS+ bS+ 
d s  ~  s  '
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Differentiating the utility function with respect to S, we find that
M ( S ,») I As] =  6(1 +  7-6 E  (AJl). (4.13)
By the induction hypothesis, the right hand side of (4.13) depends only on b and 6+. 
Substituting (4.13) into (4.12) we obtain
ha =
6 AZa
is a function of b only. Iterating (4.13) using A° =  6 we obtain
A1 =  6(1 +  7 a E  'A °»  =  6(1  + 7 „E[6-  I 6]),o*̂ |o
A | =  6(1 +  ; aE[b* | 6] +  -ZE[b+b*+ | 6]).
Then
Therefore
A ? = b ( l + 7 a P [ I - 7 a Q l ‘ ,b)
A“(6 -  W =  ( 6 ( l + 7 . P [ I - 7 a Q | - ^ ) , - (4'14)
Note that if 8  =  1 then (4.14) becomes
A;( 6 =  6i) =
( l+ 7 a P [I -7 a Q ]- lb)j ’ 
the same result as previously obtained without the 8  constraint in (2.19).
The DPE for the /3-fleet is
Ufi[&b) | ha] =  m ax_ ( l n ^ A S 6) +  7* £ ^ [ ( 5 + ,6+) | / £ ] )  . (4.15)
0< h g (b )< li0 I 6+16 J
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Differentiating the utility function (4.15) with respect to hg yields
d u a _  i _  _  7g E  / .+x
dhg hg 1 — hg 6+|6 ^
Setting expression (4.16) equal to zero we obtain
1
h} =
We now know that
dS+ bS+ 
dS ~  S  '
Differentiating the utility function with respect to 5, we find that
A,[(S,&) | ha\ = 6(1 + 7s4 E  [Aj]).
ô jo
Substituting (4.18) into (4.17) we obtain
6hg(b) =
A/»(6).
Iterating (4.13) using Ajj = 6  we obtain
A ? =  b ( l + 7 SP [ I - 7 SQ ]-1b ) .
Therefore
M  b = bt) =
( l  +  7 « P ( I -7 3 Q ]- 1b ) , ’ 
the same result as previously obtained without a 5 constraint in (2.19).
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Knowledge of 6-1- 
The DPE for the a-fleet is
C7a [(5,6+) | h fl] =  m a x , ( ln ( ta a.4S4) + 7a E  U£[(S*,b+,b++) | hg]) . (4 .2 0 )
0<ha [b)<ha t  b + + |b +  J
As before we work backwards in time.
hl = hv
and
A ° = 6
are both independent of /i° and 5°. Differentiating the utility function (4.20) with 
respect to ha yields
dUa 1
« )
1 7a S
= 77 + 7a Edha 6++|6+
E (  A+). (4.21)ha 1 — <J/la 6++|6+
Setting expression (4.21) equal to zero we obtain
S . =  (4.22)
The right hand side of equation (4.22) does not depend on S  or h$. We now know 
that
3 S + bS+ 
dS  ~  S  '
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Differentiating the utility function with respect to S, we find that
M (S ,f ’+) I he] =  6(1 +  7 ,6  E  [A j|). (4.23)O'" I O'1"
By the induction hypothesis, the right hand side of (4.13) depends only on b and b+. 
Substituting (4.23) into (4.22) we obtain
W 4+) =  JA„(6+).
Iterating (4.23) using A° =  b we obtain
A1 =  6(1 +  7 ,  £  (A“)) =  6(1 +  7 „6+), 
A' =  6(1 +  7a6+ +  72ab+E[b+^ | 6+]).
Then
Therefore
A ?  =  b  (1 +  7aP[I -  7 ,Q ] ' lb ) .
Note that if 5 = 1 then (4.24) becomes
M 6+ =  6,) =
( ( l  +  7 « P [ I -7 a Q ] - lt> ).’ 
the same result as previously obtained without a 5 constraint in (2.23). We have 
shown the optimal harvest proportion to be independent of R  and A.
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Knowledge of b~
The DPE for the a-fleet is
c y ( s ,  b-)  I 6„] =  max I  E  (In(fli.AS*) +  7.CC[(S+, b) | AJ)))  . (4.25)
0 <ha<ha l 6l6“ J
Differentiating the utility function (4.25) with respect to hQ yields
dha ha 6|6- \  ° dha J
-  £  -  ( « * » '  <4-26> 
Setting expression (4.26) equal to zero we obtain
A. =  (4.27)
5 ( 1 + 7 „ £ .(A i ) )
Differentiating the utility function with respect to S, we find that
A„[(S, b-)  | ht ] =  E  (6(1  +  7 . 6A+)) . (4.28)
Iterating (4.28) using =  E_(b) we obtain as before
6(6—
£[A?] =  P 2[ I - 7«Q]-1b.
Therefore
6.(6 -  =  6() =  (j (1 +  7ap 2 [ i _ 7<iQ ]-ib )).- <4-29>
Note that if S =  1 then (4.29) becomes
6.(6- = 6.) =
(i + 7.P2[I-7.Q]-,b)i’
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the same result as previously obtained without a 5 constraint in (2.31).
In this chapter we have tried to neutralize the advantage of the first harvester by 
restricting the allowing that harvester access to only a fraction of the fish. We have 
shown that this player compensates by increasing its harvest proportion. Therefore 
in order to make the game fair, the 8  constraint must be small enought to ensure that 
the first harvester is constrained by h. The optimal proportion is independent of R  
and A.
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Chapter 5
Split Streams
In this chapter we consider a new model and a new type of information. The two
fleets compete over the harvest of a single stock. The life cycle is illustrated in the
diagram below.
Ra — 9aR Sa =  (1 — ha)Ra
R S~ =  Sa -+- Sg —y /?*'"
\
Rg =  9gR —ySg =  (l — hg)Rg 
At the beginning of the season, the total stock splits into two streams, with stock
Ra =  9aR  available to player a  and Rg = 9 g R  available to player 0 where 9a+9g =  1.
At the end of the season, the unharvested stocks Sa and Sg reunite to form the total
escapement S = Sa + Sg =  aR, where <7 =  1 — 9aha — 9ghg.
In the following cases we change the knowledge structure by assuming the players
obtain partial knowledge of the stochastic parameters obtained by' making imperfect
74
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observations of the parameter in question. We find the optimal harvest proportions 
under various scenarios and use numerical simulations to compare the effect of the 
imperfect observations.
Imperfect Knowledge of 6
We first consider the case where the split, 9, is imperfectly measured. We assume 
that each player knows the distributions, = prob{9 =  0j\9u =  0,}, where 9„ is the 
measurement made by player u, and qj =  prob{9 =  9j}. We also assume that each 
player knows the distribution of b, where 6 is now assumed to be iid. The t/-fleet’s 
utility function thus satisfies the DPE
££[(*, M„ ) I M = “ ax E_ U n t f u h v R )  +  -ruE E ( U ? [ ( ! V , b +,8 Z )  | /£])} .
(5.1)
We now proceed iteratively, working backwards in time from the horizon. In the 
terminal period, when r  =  0 , the utility for the t/-fleet is
— max £( In(9vh„R)
Therefore the optimal choice for the h°u, is
h l = h„,
and
M l  =  1,
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independent of any action taken by the £-fleet. Using induction, we will again show 
that h i and M l  are independent of RT and of the competitor’s policy hi-
Suppose, for a given r  > 1 ,M *  is dependent only on b+. The following formulas 
will be useful
R + =  A[aR\ 6+
d R -h
=  - b +A[aR]b+- l (9vR)dhv
_  - 9 ub+R+ 
a
Differentiating the right hand side of the DPE (5.1) with respect to hTu yields
dUu
=  E. -  7. E  ( ^ £ ( 6 +M „+) ) )  . (5.2)
dhv e„\ev \ h u o+ \ab+  ) )
Setting (5.2) equal to zero, we obtain the interior solution
1 =  E ( e- ^ - tE ( b + M „ * ) )  . (5.3)
9v\e„ V <7 6+ J
Since (5.3) holds for u =  oe or /3, by the induction hypothesis we find that hv is indeed
independent of R  and h0. We now know that
dR+ , ^ . r
dR
We also note that
=  b+A[<rR]b
dUu
dR
Therefore we can write
M „ = l + 7 „E(b+M t) (5.4)
6̂
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independent of R ,b  and h0. Substituting (5.4) in (5.3), we obtain
1 =  £  (A4„ — 1). (5.5)
9„\9V \  a J
Iterating (5.4) with M °  =  1 and £ ( 6) =  6 gives 
M l  = l + 7 vE(b+),
M l  = l  + 7 uE{b +  (1  +  7yE{b++))) =  1 + 7 ub + l ib 2,
Letting r  —>• oo, we find the limiting, time independent relations for the infinite- 
horizon:
^ ”  =  1 + r ^  <5-6)
and
1 - & ( * ¥ * )  A -  ( 5 j )
Imperfect Knowledge of b
We now consider the case where the growth parameter, b, is imperfectly measured. 
We assume th a t each player knows the distributions, =  pro6 {6  =  bj \ b„ =  6,}, 
where b„ is the measurement of 6 made by player u and also pj — prob{b =  bj}. We 
also assume tha t each player knows the distribution of 0 , where 9 is assumed to be 
iid. The DPE for the u -fleet is
Uv{{S~bvM  | hg] =  max (  £  (ln (0A ,A S 6) + 7 *E E  (u ? [(S +,b t ,9 t )  \ •
0<h„<h„ v6|6„ V &&  V J /  J
(5.8)
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In the terminal period, when r  =  0, the utility for the i/-fleet is
UQU =  max E \u{BvhuA S b)
0<h„<h,ub{bu
Therefore the optimal choice for the is
hl = K ,
and
AXbu) = E ( b \b u),
independent of any action taken by the P-fleet and of S . Using induction, we will 
again show that hTv and are independent of S T and of the competitor’s policy.
Suppose, for a given r  >  1, A+ is dependent only on b+. Differentiating the right 
hand side of the DPE (5.8) with respect to hTv yields
w  = E- ( r  _ w > ) ■ <5-9)a n v 6|6„ \ n u cr b+e? /
Setting (5.9) equal to zero, we obtain
1 =  E  . (s.10)
6j6„ \  O' 6+9+ J 
Since (5.10) holds for v  =  a  or /?, using the induction hypothesis, we find that h„ is 
independent of 5  and h£. We now know that
3S+ bS+ 
dS  ~  S
and
T K = E  1(1 + ̂ E E ( X tS * ) ) .  (5.11)
C?i> 6|6„ O btOt
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Therefore we can write
.\u(b„)= E  U l + n E { A + ) )  , 
aft, \  bi J
(5.12)
independent of S and hQ. 
Let
P„ =
Pll Pl2
P21 P22
be the matrix containing the probabilities of b based on the measurement of b. 
Let J nm be the m atrix that contains the joint distributions of 6 and b,
Jnm =  pr°b(bn H bm).
It should be noted that J  can be calculated from the P  and the Pj.
Let
b„ = Eb
=  E  b ■ prob(b» =  bj)
6u =6
* j
= 5, (5.13)
and
bVi = . E  b
=  £  n>»-
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Iterating (5.9), using A° =  E(b \ bv), gives
A i ( M =  Eb{H-y„E(E[b+ \bt])),
6|6V bZ
or equivalently,
A ^  =  6i ) = 6r ( l  +  7 X )
Letting r  —► oo, we find the limiting, time independent relations for the infinite- 
horizon:
A„(&„ =  bi) =  Sr(l +  t A  +  %bl +  • • •) =  r
SO
1 -  7 A
E K ~  =  r r r -  (5' 14)6+ 1 — ft/by
Substituting (5.14) into (5.10) we obtain
_ 1
a ( l  -  7 „6„)
' " f y b y d y h y
1 =  — ------- =-7. (0 .10)
We note that h is independent of 6 .
Imperfect Knowledge of b and 6
We now consider the case where both b and 9, are imperfectly measured and lid. We
assume that each player knows the distributions, p£, and the true distributions of 
9 and b. The DPE for the u -fleet is
UU[ { S , K X )  IM =
max [ e  E  (hL{9,,huA S b) + lt,E E U ?[{S+X , 9 t )  | h + ] U . (5.16)
0<A„<A„ V J J
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In the terminal period, when r  — 0, the utility for the t'-fieet is
U„ = max E  E_ \n(9vhvA S b).
0<hu<Hub\bu9v\8u
Therefore the optimal choice for the hi, is
h l = hv,
and
a ;  =  E {i  i k \
independent of any action taken by the £/-0eet and of S. Using induction, we again 
show that h i  and AI  are independent of ST and of the competitor’s policy.
Suppose, for a given r  > 1 , A+ is dependent only on b~. Differentiating the right 
hand side of the DPE (5.16) with respect to hi yields
^  =  E  E  ( i  -  ^ £ £ ( A J ) )  . (5.17)
cm* b\bu8*\ev \r iv <r btat J
Setting (5.17) equal to zero, we obtain
1 = E  E  ( ll>6 uh~E E (A t) ]  . (5.18)
9v\8*b\bv \  a  bt§? J
Since (5.18) holds for v — a  or /?, using the induction hypothesis we find that hv is
independent of S  and hs . We now know that
dS+ bS+ 
d S  ~  S  '
and
E ^ a  +  K E M X tS * ) ) .  (5.19)
Ob 6|6„ o  b?91
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Therefore we can write
A*(6„) =  E  fb ( l  + 7 ^ ( A + ) )  , (5.20)
b\bu \  6+ /
independent of S  and h0. 
Iterating (5.20), we again obtain
bt-\b„ 1 -  7 „&
Substituting (5.21) into (5.18) we obtain
E  A+(oo) =  T  (5-21)
1— 7 =  E  & v K { h )  (5 20)
7ub 9u\eu <J
Imperfect Knowledge of 6 with b Markovian
For our last case we assume 9 is imperfectly measured, the growth parameter b has a 
known Markov distribution, and that the value of b~ is known while the value of b is 
unknown. The ^-fleet’s utility function satisfies the DPE
U l[ { S ,b -X )  I hB\ =  max. E  E  (ln(0„/i„AS6) + 7 V E  E{Cf?[{S+ ,6,0+) | A + ])l.
0<h„<h„au\evb\b- ^ b+\b§+ J
(5.23)
In the terminal period when r  =  0 we find the utility for the z/-fleet to be
U ?=  E  E  (ln(0„/i„AS6)).
Therefore the optimal choice for the hQu is
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and
M [ S , i - ( 9 ) J | / i p) s £ ( 6 | 6 - ) I
independent of any action taken by the opponent’s fleet.
Suppose for a given r  > 1 , A* is dependent only on 6+. Differentiating the right 
hand side of the DPE (5.23) with respect to h Vl we obtain
Tzr- = E  E. -r—  1 * E  E  ( —)  • (5.24)
d h v b\b-9v\ev h.v 6=1 b e t \ c r  J
Setting (5.24) equal to zero, we obtain
1 = 7 ,J ?  E  ^ A + ( 6). (5.25)
b\b~9v\a„ O
Since (5.25) holds for u — a  or 0  we find that h„ is independent of 5  and h0. We now 
know that
E  E  ( ^ ( 1 + i r E  ES+ A+)V 3S  6|6-^|9w \ 5  6+|6fl+ J
Therefore we can write
A „ ( n  =  E  6(1  +  7 , E Atm- (5-26)0\0
independent of S  and h Substituting (5.26) in (5.25) gives
1 = E  E  ^ A j .  (5.27)
b\b-9»\e* <J
Iterating (5.26) gives
£[A“ * | (6-  =  6i)J =  (P 2[I -  7 i , Q l - 1 b ) i .
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Numerical Simulation Results
In the following figures we show the average of W, the historically preferred utility 
function (see (2.32)). F igu re  5.1 In this figure player one has no knowledge of 9, 
that is, player one’s measurement is no better than tossing a coin to determine the 
value of 9. The independent variable is the knowledge of 9 by player two. A scale of 
0  to 1 is used, with 0 representing no knowledge and 1 representing full knowledge. 
The parameters were set to heavily favor player one. When player two takes more 
accurate measurements, player two’s utility is greatly increased. At the same time, 
player one’s utility decreases although not as sharply as the increase for player two.
0.042
020.1 a s a s
Figure 5.1: Comparison of W 1 with W 2
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F ig u re  5.2 In this figure player one has full knowledge of 9. The independent 
variable is the knowledge of 9 by player two. The parameters were chosen to be 
symmetric among the two players. As expected, player two’s utility increases as 
player two gains knowledge.
2.56
2.54
2.52
25
2.46
2.44
2.42
0 .1 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.8 a s
Figure 5.2: Comparison of W l  with W 2
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F ig u re  5.3 In this figure player one has some knowledge of 9. The independent 
variable is the knowledge of 9 by player two. The parameters were chosen to be 
symmetric among the two players. The two average values for the utilities are equal 
at the point where both players measure 9 with the same accuracy.
2.56
154
2.52
2.5
146
144
1 50.1 0.2 0.7 OS 0.9
Figure 5.3: Comparison of W l  with IV2
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F ig u re  5.4 In this figure the independent variable is the knowledge of 9 by player 
one and two. The parameters were chosen to be symmetric among the two players. 
When 9 is measured with better accuracy, both player’s utilities increases.
Q M T I1  •  u . 0  Q a m * »  U . 9
trwcais ad  <r*ca2v a  4 ptfwtat » 0.5 nnatis t tmaxz* t
25!
25
a i 02 06 0.7 0.9
Figure 5.4: Comparison of W 1 with W 2
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed extensions of a classical fishery model. We derived the 
Nash equilibrium harvest strategies in closed form analytical expressions as explicit 
functions of fundamental biological and economic parameters. We also incorporated 
a wide range of possible information structures.
In all cases we found the optimal harvest proportions to be multiplicative, inde­
pendent of the recruitment R. This relates to the risk averse utility function and is in 
contrast to models that are risk neutral and lead to an optimal constant escapement. 
We also found that optimal harvest proportions exhibit a certainty equivalence prop­
erty with respect to the multiplicative factor A  in the growth function. This implies 
that the knowledge of A  has no significance on the outcome of the game.
Numerical explorations of the models show the amount of information does have 
an effect on the economic returns. In the sole manager game, additional knowledge
88
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always leads to an increase in return. However, in the competitive fishery, additional 
knowledge may lead the competitors to over-harvest, in turn lowering the returns.
The optimal harvest fractions and a summary of the numerical studies are given 
below.
Sole Harvester
For the deterministic version we found the optimal harvest rate to be
h — 1 — 7 6 .
For the stochastic version we found the optimal harvest rates to be
Kb = b>) = ( l+TPil-TQl-'bV
when b was known,
k =  bi) =  (1 +  7b+ (1 +  7P[I ~  7Q]~lb+) ) ,  ’ 
when 6+ was known, and
A(6 = 6 i > =  ( l  +  7 P 2[ I - 7 Q ]-lb - ) j ’
when b~ was known.
Numerical explorations led to the conclusion that for the single player game, 
additional knowledge always results in higher economic returns.
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Competitive Fishery
In the competitive fishery we found the optimal harvest rate for each player is the 
same as calculated in the single player game. The simulations led us to conclude 
that a symmetric increase in knowledge benefits the first harvester at the expense of 
the second harvester. If the increase in information is asymmetric, the player who 
has the additional knowledge will receive a higher return than with lesser knowledge, 
the other player will have a decrease in economic return when its opponent gains 
knowledge. Therefore there is no incentive inherent in the game for a player to share 
knowledge with its opponent.
VVe also found that we can not easily split the resource fairly by allowing a player 
access to only a fraction of the fish. The player will adjust his optimal harvest fraction 
to take the same amount as before he was constrained i f  enough fish are present. To 
ensure fairness we must be certain that the first player is constrained by his maximum 
harvest fraction. In this scenario the player will choose to take as much of the fish 
as he can but will leave enough stock for the second player to harvest his fair share 
while leaving enough stock to spawn for the next season.
Our last model incorporated a spatial instead of a temporal split and introduced 
imperfect measuring of the stochastic parameters. This allows us to vary the amount 
of knowledge by small increments instead of b,b+,b~ as in the previous work. Nu­
merical simulations of this model provided a variety of possible outcomes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Calculation of Joint D istribution
Calculation of J
Given pt- =  prob(b =  b{) and x^ =  prob(b = bj \ b =  6t), we wish to find the
jnm  — prob(bn PI bm). Let p* = prob(bi) and p* =  prob(bi) then
n n n n
E * *  =  pi, E * »  =  Pi, E *  =  i, E ^  =  i.
fc = t i = l  i = l  i = l
We can write x ik =  and use these relations to solve for j,*. For example when 
n  =  2, we have j u  — p ixu  and J21 =  (1 — Pi)^2i- Adding these expressions we find
Pi =  j u  +  J21 =  P t(^u  — ^21) +  2T2i or pi =  ^ 1Z11 — X21
Therefore we can find the joint distribution matrix whose entries are
i l l  =  P l^ U i  J l2  =  P lP l2 ) J21 =  (1  — P l)^2 1 i J22 =  (1  — P l)^22-
91
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Calculation of xjk
Given pi =  prob(b =  6,) and Xij =  prob(b =  bj j 6 =  b{), we wish to find the
x jk =  prob(b = bk \b = bj). Then jij =  piXijt p} -  YiiPi^a  and
_   jkj   Pk^kj
jk - r"' -
Pi
Likewise given g* =  prob(9 =  0,) and g^ =  prob(9 = 9j \ 9 = 9*), we wish to find the
g jfc  =  pro&(0 =  9 k \ 9  =  9 j ) .  VVe find =  g ^ ,  q j  =  q ^ j  and
„ _  s*i _  W kjQjk - r*̂  -
Qj H i MU
Two Independent observations
Now consider two independent observations of b, namely bu and Define
iijk  =  prob(bu =  bj, b0 = bk \b = b j
=  pro&[6„ =  6j | 6 =  6*] • prob\bg =  6* | 6 =  6*]
jijAr =  pro6[6 =  6t, b„ — 6j, bo — 6jt]
=  Pi^ijk
=  P . ^ f *  and
xO* =  pro6[6 =  bj} b0 = bk \bu = bj}
pro&[6„ — 6 ■* 6jj bo — 6jj»J
pro&[6„ =  6j]
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where prob[bu =  6,] =  JV  J2k xujik. So
We can also consider two independent observations of 9, namely §a and Q^eta. Define
hjk  =  prob(9a = 9j t 9& = 9 k \ 9 = 9i)
= prob[9a = 9j \ 9 = 0,-j • prob[9$ = 9k \ 9 =  9i]
=
Sijk =  prob[9 = 9U 9a = 9j, h  =  #*]
=  Q iSijk
=  <Zi s^qfk and
Qijk =  pro&[0 =  9j t §p = 9 k \9a = 9j]
_  prob[9a =  9j, 9 =  9j} 9p =  gfc] 
pro6[0a =  0j]
where profi[0a =  0*] =  $*•
b Markovian
Suppose b is Markovian and b~ — bm is known but b is observed through 6 . Then in 
part A.2, replace pt- =  pro6[6 =  &,-] by pmi =  pro6[& =  6,- | b~ =  6m]. Now suppose
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prob\b | 6] is also known. We can calculate
jjk\i = prob[b =  bjt b =  bk \ b~ =  6*]
=  prob[b = bj | b~ =  6,] • prob([b =  b 
=  PijZjk
and
*i*|( =  proitf4 =  4i I 4 =  4») I 4~ =  M
i 4 = y  i 4_)
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